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COMMENTS
CONCURRENT RIGHT TO SURFACE USE IN CONJUNCTION
WITH OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN LOUISIANA
The proper development of a given tract of land for oil and
gas exploration and exploitation generally requires the use of
a considerable amount of land; however, not all of a tract is
usually needed. Thus, the land will be suitable for more pur-
poses than oil exploration. As land values increase, the right
to use this land concurrently with oil and gas activities becomes
more valuable.
Concurrent use rights to a tract of land may originate in
several manners. The most common situation is that in which
the landowner grants only a mineral lease, retaining his surface
rights. Many times, however, the landowner leases both the
surface and mineral rights concurrently. Also there is the pos-
sibility of a mineral servitude owner, his assignee, or lessee,
conducting oil and gas operations.
The purpose of this Comment is to survey the solutions
reached by courts of other jurisdictions and to examine Lou-
isiana jurisprudence arising out of controversies involving con-
current surface rights. A useful approach in preliminary analysis
of the merits of such controversies might be taken by first con-
sidering whether the activity in question constitutes an activity
authorized by the nature of the right a party claims. If the
activity is authorized, it should next be determined whether the
activity was performed in a proper manner. It is not suggested
that this twofold approach be taken as a standard per se, merely
that it would be useful as an analytical tool.
Other Jurisdictions
In other jurisdictions, no precise distinction seems to be
made between the standard applicable to the mineral lessor-
is a relevant fact. ... LA. R.S. 9:396 (Supp. 1972). It has been suggested
that the model act has applicability in the following areas: 1. disavowal
action; 2. divorce where ground Is adultery; 3. mother seeking custody of
children; 4. when another claims paternity; 5. dispute over child's claim
to an estate; 6. to prove non-citizenship of a child; 7. rape and bastardy
cases. Gold, 1962-63 Survey of Pennsylvania Law--Domestic Relations, 25
U. PITT. L. Rsv. 341, 347 (1963). Although this Comment concerned institu-
tion of the suit by a husband to overcome the presumption of legitimacy,
it does not seem the act is restricted as to what party may bring the
action. This could have far reaching effects in Louisiana since the courts
have held that only the husband may Institute the action en desaveu. Suc-
cession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892).
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lessee and the mineral estate owner-landowner relationship.'
Generally, the mineral operator is allowed to use the land to
the extent reasonably necessary to extract the minerals, employ-
ing the customary and accepted practices of the industry. Also,
each party must use the surface with due regard for the rights
of the other."
Many cases have arisen concerning the extent to which the
mineral operator may use the surface. The mineral operator
may use only that portion of the surface reasonably necessary.8
Thus, if it is found that the operator's use is reasonably neces-
sary, he will not be liable for destruction of timber and growing
crops.4 He is free to use the land for a wide variety of activities
accessory to his actual extraction of minerals.5 His use of the
1 See generally H. WLUAMS & C. MYERs, On. & GAs LAw §1 218-7, 218-8
(1971).
2. E.g., Union Prod. Co. v. Pittman, 245 Miss. 427, 433, 146 So.2d 553, 555
(1962): "[Rlights of owners of minerals are limited to so much of the sur-
face and such use thereof as is reasonably necessary to properly mine and
carry away the minerals. These rights are also subject to the limitations
that the mineral owner does not use the surface in such a way as unneces-
sarily to destroy or injure it. The right to remove minerals by the usual
or customary method of mining exists, even though the surface of the
ground may be wholly destroyed as a result thereof. The owner of the
surface and the owner of the minerals should have due regard for each
other and should exercise that degree of care and use which is a just
consideration for rights of the other. The owner of the surface of the land
has the right to enjoy the land free from annoyance, except such as rea-
sonably arises from the opening, exploitation, mining, and marketing of the
minerals. The mineral owner on the other hand is not limited by the fact
that his acts may cause inconvenience to the surface owner." See also Lone
Star Prod. Co. v. Jury, 445 P.2d 284 (Okla. 1968); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton,
317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Miller v. Crown Cent. Petr. Co., 309
S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
As to burden of proof, acts by the mineral operator are seldom con-
sidered negligence per se. Peters Petr. Co. v. Alred, 156 Okla. 249, 10 P.2d
705 (1932). In order to recover, the surface owner must prove both the ex-
tent of injury and that the injury was due to negligent operations, in dis-
regard of his concurrent use rights. Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83
P.2d 389 (1938).
3. Union Prod. Co. v. Plttman, 245 Miss. 427, 435, 146 So.2d 553, 556
(1962).
4. Gulf Oil Ref. Co. v. Davis, 224 Miss. 464, 80 So.2d 467 (1955).
5. Gulf Oil Ref. Co. v. Davis, 224 Miss. 464, 80 So.2d 467 (1955) (construc-
tion of pits for the storage of salt water); Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 183 Okla.
489, 83 P.2d 389 (1938) (construction of ditches for removal of salt water);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (construction
of new access roads); Joyner v. R.H. Dearing & Sons, 134 S.W.2d 757,
759 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (construction of quarters for a watchman when
deemed reasonably necessary to protect the operations "is a question of
fact whether, in connection with the production of oil, the saving and
marketing thereof, this is not reasonably necessary and incidental").
A recurring problem involves the use of water in connection with
mineral operations. Surface water may be used for mineral activities,
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surface in conjunction with unit operations on neighboring lands
has been held proper in several instances." The lessee may also
select the site for his operations, subject only to the require-
ments of reasonable necessity and reasonable regard for other
concurrent users.7
Once it is established that the mineral operator may perform
the activity in question, the courts will usually next determine
whether the operation was performed in a proper manner. Negli-
gence in conducting operations otherwise deemed necessary may
result in liability.8
Rusell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956), but only for the develop-
ment of minerals beneath the premises, Stradley v. Magnolia Petr. Co., 155
S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), and then only to the extent reasonably
necessary, Gray v. Ellis, 257 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1958). The mineral operator
may construct a pond where found reasonably necessary, Wardell v. Watson,
93 Mo. 107, 5 S.W. 605 (1887), and may ordinarily drill a water well, Tweedy
v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968). But see Arkansas-La. Gas
Co. v. Wood, 240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 (1966) (defendant mineral lessee
was deemed unauthorized to extract water from lessor's artificial stock
pond). This case is distinguishable, however, in that by completely draining
lessor's artificial stock pond, which was filled by lessor's own wells, the
mineral lessee both engaged In an excessive use of surface water, and
breached specific lease provisions. The Arkansas supreme court did not
refute the proposition that the mineral lessee is entitled to necessary and
reasonable use of surface water.
6. Holt v. Southwest Antioch Sand Unit, Fifth Enlarged, 292 P.2d 998
(Okla. 1955) (a well which is no longer producing may still be operated
for extraction of salt water used in secondary recovery on adjoining prem-
ises, when both premises are unitized and the secondary recovery results
in increased unit production); Miller v. Crown Cent. Petr. Co., 309 S.W.2d
876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (pipelines carrying salt water across the surface
for use on adjoining unitized premises are permitted).
7. E.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260, 263-64 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958): "[T]he holder of the mineral estate has the right to put his wells
where he wants to, and that does not mean that he shall be forced to use
or try to utilize abandoned wells, or that he must drill so close to such
abandoned wells that he can utilize all or part of the former drill site."
See also Lone Star Prod. Co. v. Jury, 445 P.2d 284 (Okla. 1968); Davon Oil
Co. v. Steele, 186 Okla. 380, 98 P.2d 618 (1940); Reading & Bates Offshore
Drilling Co. v. Jergenson, 453 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Shell Petr.
Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand Co., 128 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939);
Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). A well
site may not be selected, however, if it would unduly threaten the property
and lives of surface owners, especially where other well sites are available.
Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Pawnee-Tulsa Petr. Co., 34 Okla. 775, 127 P. 252 (1912).
8. E.g., where the mineral operator has constructed facilities for the
storage and removal of salt water, he need not normally erect fences to
keep the landowner's cattle out, Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83 P.2d
389 (1938), but may be held liable for failure to take reasonable precau-
tions after discovering that the surface owner's cattle have been wandering
into unprotected salt water pits, Peters Petr. Co. v. AZred, 156 Okla. 249,
10 P.2d 705 (1932), or for constructing such pits while charged with knowl-
edge of the presence of cattle and having failed to give adequate notice
of the proposed undertaking, Texas Co. v. Mosshamer, 175 Okla. 202, 51 P.2d
757 (1935). Liability for the destruction of trees or cattle occasioned by the
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In other jurisdictions, then, the standard of reasonable neces-
sity governs whether a particular surface use is authorized, but
reasonable care is required in conducting such operations. This
is the language of negligence. Courts elsewhere have not, how-
ever, carefully divided their inquiries by asking first whether
the activity is authorized and second whether, if authorized,
proper care has been observed9 Such an approach might well
lead to an easier analytical process and better reasoned opinions
in these cases.
Louisiana Mineral Lessors and Lessees
Although Louisiana courts have long held that mineral leases
are to be administered in accordance with the Civil Code pro-
visions governing leases generally,10 they have paid little atten-
tion to the articles which might be utilized to resolve disputes
concerning surface use. From these Civil Code provisions several
general propositions may be listed. The lessor is bound to deliver
the premises, maintain it in a suitable condition for the pur-
pose leased, and afford the lessee peaceable possession." The
lessor may make no alteration during the term of the lease.12
On the other hand, the lessee is bound to use the leased premises
as a good administrator, and only for the use intended.13 At the
termination of the lease, the lessee, is bound to return the leased
item in the same state in which it was delivered to him, with
allowance for wear and tear and unavoidable accidents. 14 The
construction of such pits in a negligent manner may also result. Gulf
Oil Ref. Co. v. Davis, 224 Miss. 464, 80 So.2d 467 (1955); Pine v. Robson,
187 Okla. 679, 105 P.2d 530 (1940). See also Warren Petr. Corp. v. Helsm, 207
Okla. 699, 252 P.2d 447 (1952); Magnolia Petr. Co. v. Howard, 182 Okla. 101,
77 P.2d 18 (1938); Phillips Petr. Co. v. Bartmess, 181 Okla. 501, 76 P.2d 352
(1937); Texas Co. v. Taylor, 178 Okla. 21, 61 P.2d 574 (1936).
9. Factors that may be of importance in reaching such a determination
might include the value of the surface use, whether there are alternative
sites or methods available, and the relative costs and benefits of these
alternatives to the parties involved. It is equally possible that the party
entitled to use of the surface may also conduct activities either unauthorized
or improper in light of the mineral operator's rights. In such an event, the
same approach could be utilized.
10. Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956); Milling v.
Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679 (1952); Tyson v. Surf. Oil
Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940).
11. LA. Civ. COns art. 2692.
12. Id. art. 2698.
13. Id. art. 2710. If this latter tenet is violated, the lessor is entitled to
dissolution of the lease and damages occasioned by such misuse. Id. art.
2711.
14. Id. arts. 2719-20.
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lessee is liable only for injuries and losses occasioned through
his own fault,1 5 but remains liable for waste caused by his sub-
lessee.' The neglect of either party to fulfill his engagements
may cause a dissolution of the lease, except that the judge shall
not order any delay in the dissolution.' 7
It would appear that these Code articles are directly on
point in mineral lease cases involving rights to surface use, but
reliance upon them alone would be unwise. It has been rec-
ognized that the mineral lessor-lessee relationship is one of a
special nature, because the mineral lease is not a normal lease
as envisioned by the redactors of the Civil Code.' 8 The approach
and standards used in Louisiana decisions thus strongly resemble
those of other jurisdictions, using the language of ordinary negli-
gence and not dividing the inquiries involved as suggested above.
The Louisiana cases also yield the same principles as those
in other jurisdictions. A mineral lessee may extend his opera-
tions only to the extent reasonably necessary to effectively
produce the minerals under the terms of the lease contract,
and should maintain and restore the premises in its original
condition, subject to his rightful use.19 He must exercise his
rights with reasonable regard for concurrent users and has a
reciprocal right to similar consideration.2° The lessee must prove
actual injury and the extent of such injury.2 1 Express provisions
of the lease regarding surface use are honored,2 and the provi-
sions of the Civil Code concerning conventional obligations are
applicable. 23
15. Id. art. 2721.
16. Id. art. 2722.
17. Id. art. 2729. This delay provision has been found inapplicable in
mineral lease cases. Rudnick v. Union Prod. Co., 209 La. 943, 25 So.2d 906
(1946); Edwards v. Standard Oil Co., 175 La. 720, 144 So. 430 (1932); Brewer
v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931).
18. Wemple v. Pasadena Petr. Co., 147 La. 532, 85 So. 230 (1920).
19. Smith v. Schuster, 66 So.2d 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
20. Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 260 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. La. 1966),
a f'd, 387 F.2d 903, modified on other grounds, 400 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. Bean v. Tennessee Trans. Co., 136 So.2d 315 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961);
Lelong v. Richardson, 126 So.2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
22. E.g., Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So.2d 253 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1958) (contract providing for all damages caused to timber and
growing crops).
23. Roy 0. Martin Lmbr. Co. v. Pan American Petr. Corp., 177 So.2d 153
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). The lease clause provided that the lessee was to
be responsible for all damages to land, crops, timber, and improvements
due to its operations. Upon determination that timber had been destroyed,
damages for only the timber merchantable at that time were allowed:
1973]
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Applying these principles, the lessee may cut timberu or
clear farmland25 in order to establish a well site. The con-
struction of overflow pits,20 removal of fences,27 and conduct
of seismic operations2s are considered proper conduct by a min-
eral lessee. No Louisiana cases have been found in which a
mineral lessee involved in litigation with his mineral lessor was
found to have been engaged in a clearly unauthorized activity.2
As to the manner of performance, the lessee in clearing well
sites must minimize destruction of timber and cut no more
the damage to timber not yet merchantable was not allowed since it was
found too speculative and not within the contemplation of the parties as
governed by Civil Code article 1934. See also LA. Cv. CoDE arts. 2668, 2710,
2721.
24. Wemple v. Pasadena Petr. Co., 147 La. 532, 85 So. 230 (1920).
25. Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So.2d 253 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1958).
26. Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So.2d 25S (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1958); Smith v. Schuster, 66 So.2d 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
27. Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So.2d 253 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1958).
28. Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 260 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. La. 1966),
afl'd, 387 F.2d 903, modified on other grounds, 400 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1968).
In Pennington, there was no question of damages caused by blasting. Lou-
isiana courts have dealt with several cases in which damages to founda-
tions, water wells, and levees caused by geophysical explosions were com-
pensated. The most notable of these decisions is Fontenot v. Magnolia Petr.
Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955), in which recovery seemed to be pred-
icated upon Civil Code article 667, but where the court also spoke of
"the doctrine of absolute liability." A similar result is found in pate v.
Western Geophysical Co. of America, 91 So.2d 431 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956),
but is based upon a finding that the mineral operator was absolutely liable
for the consequences of blasting. In Langlnals v. Geophys4cal Serv. Inc., 237
La. 585, 111 So.2d 781 (1959), plaintiff agricultural lessee was awarded dam-
ages against defendant, an agent of the tract's mineral lessee conducting
seismic operations, based upon the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
court there avoided consideration of article 667 and the doctrine of absolute
liability as announced in Fontenot. See also, Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employees Liab.
Assur. Corp., 170 So.2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
If the theory of absolute liability should be rejected in favor of a theory
of liability based upon article 667, a strict application of that article would
be of no benefit to those with concurrent rights to the use of a particular
surface area, as the article speaks only of adjoining landowners. It may be
questionable from a policy standpoint to draw such a distinction since there
is no apparent reason for distinguishing a landowner or a surface lessee
from a neighboring landowner. While it may be argued that the parties
were cognizant of the right of the mineral operator to conduct such seismic
activities, disastrous or extraordinary consequences certainly should not be
held to have been within their contemplation.
29. In East v. Pan American Petr. Corp., 168 So.2d 426 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964), the court found that lessee's action in excavating lessor's marshland
for the construction of a board road to a well site on adjacent land was
neither necessary nor reasonable. The court based its finding, however, upon
the terms of the lease contract and the intent of the parties.
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fences than is reasonably necessary.3 Further, the lessee is under
no obligation to protect lessor's fences from the activities of
operators on adjacent premises.31 The lessee is obligated, upon
completion of operations, to restore the premises to its former
condition.as Seismic operations may not be conducted in such
a manner as to deprive the landowner entirely of his right to
use the surface, particularly where alternative sites or methods
are available3m Damages are apparently limited to physical
damage as it has been held that a lessee is not liable for damages
due to mental anguish caused by noises normally incident to
drilling operations.
The correlative rights of lessor and lessee concerning sur-
face use were confirmed in Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co.35
Unlike most lessor-lessee disputes, this arose out of a demand
by the lessee that the landowner cease certain activities which,
lessee asserted, interfered with its right to conduct seismic
activities. The lessee sought to have Colonial shut down all
pipeline operations so as not to interfere with its seismic testing,
demanding drainage of all lines and storage tanks which might
be in the way. The court reasoned that to grant plaintiff the
relief sought would constitute an undue interference with
Colonial's right to reasonable use of the property. It was decided
that by altering the exploration plan, plaintiff could efficiently
exercise his right and at the same time allow Colonial to con-
tinue its operations. The decision is commendable in that it
recognizes the right of each party to concukrently carry on
authorized activity in a reasonable and proper manner.
It appears that an initial determination of whether the
activity in question was an authorized one, and if so, whether
it was conducted in a reasonable and proper manner could prove
30. Wemple v. Pasadena Petr. Co., 147 La. 532, 85 So. 230 (1920). It was
found in this case that the mineral lessor simply failed to show that lessee
cut an unreasonable amount of timber.
31. Id.
32. Smith v. Schuster, 66 So.2d 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953). This case
involved restoration of land cleared for a well site and upon which pits
had been constructed.
33. Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 260 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. La. 1966),
aff'd, 387 F.2d 903, modified on other grounds, 400 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1968).
34. Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So.2d 253 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1958).
35. 260 F. Supp. 643 (E.D, La. 1966), aff'd, 387 F.2d 903, modified on other
grounds, 400 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1968).
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helpful in analyzing situations such as in Penningto.86 More
reliance might also be placed upon pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code.
Surface Lessee and Mineral Lessee
Upon first impression, the problems as to right to surface
use between a surface lessee and a mineral lessee would not
appear substantial. It would seem that the surface lessee should
be entitled to exercise the same rights to surface use as his
lessor, unless the lease granted him some inferior right. In
Louisiana cases of this nature, however, it has been said that
each must conduct his operations with due regard for the rights
of the other, employing reasoning similar to that used by both
36. Two hypothetical situations may illustrate the value of these sug-
gestions. Assume a mineral lessee has ten wells on lessor's land, five of
which are still productive. Is the mineral lessee obligated to restore the
surface area after cessation of operations in each particular area, or must
he only return the leased premises in good condition after the termination
of the lease itself? It is evident that the lessee, in occupying surface area
no longer needed for the proper conduct of mineral operations, is now
engaged in unauthorized activity, and should be compelled to remove the
non-productive wells. The code provisions on lease provide authority for
arrival at such a conclusion. The lessee, according to Civil Code article
2710, must "enjoy the thing leased as a good administrator, according to
the use for which it was intended by the lease." Occupation of surface
area by structures which no longer contribute to the conduct of mineral
activities cannot be considered the action of a good administrator, accord-
ing to the use intended by the lease. Civil Code article 2711 provides that
the lessee must not make another use of the thing than that for which
it was intended. The lessee, by occupying surface area without in any man-
ner facilitating mineral development, has then engaged in unauthorized
activity and has specifically violated code provisions.
Another conceivable situation is one in which the mineral lessor may
wish to put the property to a use which may make mineral exploration
and development difficult or impossible (e.g., a lessor who begins construc-
tion of a shopping center and parking lot which would cover most or all
of the leased premises). It is obvious that the lessor would be utilizing his
right to surface use In a completely unreasonable manner, without regard
to the concurrent rights of his mineral lessee. Civil Code article 2692
requires the lessor to "maintain the thing in a condition such as to serve
for the use for which it is hired." Civil Code article 2698 provides a lessor
may not "make any alteration in the thing during the continuance of the
lease." These articles could provide a basis for compelling the lessor to
refrain from activities which would deny his lessee the right to engage in
the proper conduct of mineral operating.
37. E.g., Lauzon v. J.C. Trahan Drilling Contr., Inc., 247 So.2d 236 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writs refused, 259 La. 69, 249 So.2d 206 (1971). The mineral
lessee "cannot conduct his operations in disregard of the rights of the
oyster lessee." 247 So.2d at 240.
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Louisiana courts and courts of other jurisdictions in dealing with
the lessor-lessee relationship.u
The results of Louisiana decisions illustrate these principles.
The surface lessee is not authorized to engage in activity which
is clearly within the authority of the mineral lessee.3 9 However,
in spite of past misconduct by the surface lessee, the mineral
lessee is not entitled to enjoin him from re-entering the leased
premises for reasonable exercise of his own rights.40
A mineral lessee of state-owned waterbottoms is liable for
pollution damages which an oyster lessee can prove were the
proximate cause of such injuries. 41 The mineral lessee is en-
titled to dredge channels through oyster beds when it is found
reasonably necessary for its mineral operations.42 As long as
the dredging is conducted in a reasonable manner and is neces-
sary, no damages will be assessed.43 If the mineral lessee know-
ingly dredges a channel through an oyster bed when he is aware
of an alternate site which would minimize damages, he will be
responsible for the loss occasioned thereby.44 The mineral lessee
will not be liable for oyster bed damages arising from seismic
38. See Collins v. Morrow, 234 So.2d 234 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), where
the surface lessee was held entitled to damages for the loss of a cow
due to mineral lessee's negligent action in allowing seepage of salt water
and oil wastes.
39. Standard Oil Co. v. Kinnebrew, 155 La. 1009, 99 So. 802 (1924). Here
the surface lessee was given all rights to the use of the surface, including
the right to reclaim waste oil. The court enjoined the surface lessee from
measures aimed at taking waste oil that the mineral lessee had himself
salvaged by development of new operating techniques.
40. Id.
41. Doucet v. Texas Co., 205 La. 312, 17 So.2d 340 (1944). The burden of
proof is upon the party alleging the damage. Compare Trosclair v. Superior
Oil Co., 219 So.2d 278 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969) (oyster lessee failed to meet
the burden of proof), with Skansi v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 176 So.2d 236
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) (burden of proof was met and damages allowed).
The court in Trosclair suggested a very high burden of proof upon the
oyster lessee, because it took the oyster lease subject to the outstanding
mineral lease and was aware of the risk.
42. Collins v. Texas Co., 267 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1959); Vodopija v. Gulf
Ref. Co., 198 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1952); Begovich, Gonzales, & Plaisance v.
Texas Co., 209 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. La. 1962). See also Vodopija v. Tennessee
Gas Trans. Co., 152 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. La. 1957).
43. E.g., Vodopija v. Gulf Ref. Co., 152 F. Supp. 14, 17 (E.D. La. 1957):
"Each industry has a right to operate side by side under its permits or
leases and as long as it operates reasonably and with due regard for the
rights of others, any damage to those rights is damnum absque injuria."
44. Lauzon v. J.C. Trahan Drilling Contr., Inc., 247 So.2d 236 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writs refused, 259 La. 69, 249 So.2d 206 (1971).
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operations, provided they are not conducted in a negligent
manner.
45
Trosclair v. Superior Oil Company" raises a question as to
the impact of order of recordation on the mineral lessee's duty
towards concurrent users. Trosclair involved suit by an oyster
lessee against a mineral lessee who had recorded his lease prior
to the beginning of plaintiff's lease. Plaintiff alleged that defen-
dant allowed the escape of wastes which subsequently damaged
plaintiff's oysters. The court found that defendant did indeed
discharge wastes, but that plaintiff had failed to prove that this
discharge was the cause of the oyster damage. Although there
seemed to be proper justification for such a conclusion, some of
the opinion language, if read literally and out of context with
the 'above mentioned cases, could be misconstrued. The court
stated that, even if plaintiff had met his burden of proof, the
defendant's prior recordation would subordinate the oyster lease
to the mineral lease.47
It is questionable whether the concept of registry should be
used to enable one who has a previously recorded lease to engage
in activity which he could not perform had the landowner not
leased the property. In Trosclair, it cannot seriously be con-
tended that if the state itself had been engaged in oyster fishing
on its lands rather than leasing for that purpose, it could not
recover for mineral lessee's discharge of pollutants into the
water. This action constitutes clearly improper and unreason-
able conduct of mineral operations. Should the oyster lessee,
who purportedly has the same rights to the use of the water-
45. Collette v. Marine Exploration Co., 213 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. La. 1963).
46. 219 So.2d 278 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
47. "[0]ur Courts have consistently held that an oyster bed lease is
subject and subordinated to a mineral lease, which was dated and recorded
prior to the oyster lease." Id. at 281. As authority for this proposition the
court cited VodopiJa v. Gulf Ref. Co., 198 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1952), and
Collette v. Marine Exploration Co., 213 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. La. 1963). While
both of these federal cases dealt with the manner of recordation, it cannot
be fairly said that they stand for the proposition that the oyster lease is
subject and subordinated to the prior recorded mineral lease. The im-
portance that these two cases placed on recordation was simply that the
oyster lessee should have been aware of mineral lessee's authority to conduct
authorized mineral exploration and exploitation activities. Both of these
cases were decided in favor of the mineral lessee on the basis of the oyster
lessee's failure to meet the burden of proof. No inference was based solely
upon defendant's prior recordation. Indeed, both cases refer to the neces-
sity for each lessee to conduct his activities with due regard to the rights
of the other. "Both parties have a right and an obligation to conduct
their respective operations and to so conduct them in a manner that will
not negligently cause damage to the other." Id. at 611.
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bottoms for growing oysters as the state, be denied recovery
simply because he has recorded his lease later than the mineral
lessee? Should the mineral lessee, who has recorded his lease
after the oyster lessee, take his lease subject to the oyster
lessee's paramount right and thus not be able in any manner
to interfere with the oyster operations? Most land is adaptable
to two or more uses. This is a phenomenon that should be
encouraged rather than suppressed. A limited purpose lessee
should not be entitled to conduct his operations in such a man-
ner as to make activities by other lessees unreasonably difficult
or impossible simply by the fact of prior recordation. No violence
would be done to the public records doctrine if recordation was
viewed in its proper perspective,"8 for the simple reason that
surface and mineral lessees of the same land should not be
regarded as third parties in relation to each other. Each derives
his right from the same person, the landowner. Each is entitled
to exercise no more rights than the landowner himself could.
Each lessee, when entering the lease agreement, presumably is
cognizant of his rights and those of his lessor. The identity of
the party who exercises these rights should be of no conse-
quence.
Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co.49 illustrates another rami-
fication of recordation. In this case, plaintiff had entered a verbal
lease with the landowner for use of the surface. Defendant had
previously recorded its mineral lease. Defendant's construction
caused a lack of adequate drainage, damaging plaintiff's crops.
The mineral lease contained a clause providing that the lessee
would be responsible for all damages caused by its operations.
The court found this clause to be a stipulation pour autrui; thus,
the defendant had privity, registry was of no effect, and plaintiff
was awarded damages. Mineral lessees should heed the implica-
tions of such a result in future lease provisions dealing with
48. Recordation should properly be considered under certain circum-
stances, as the following example will illustrate. Suppose the mineral lessee
records first. Mineral and surface lessee become involved in a dispute over
the use of a particular parcel of land. Both parties prove that they would
use the parcel for authorized activity, and that they would do so in a reason-
able and proper manner. Neither could perform this activity on another part
of the leased premises, or relocation would entail great inconvenience and
expense. The public records doctrine should, in this case, entitle mineral
lessee to conduct such activity. The public records doctrine, then, should
be utilized only where compatible uses are impossible or extremely incon-
venient.
49. 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347 (1969).
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damages. Surface lessees and any others who may have derived
some right from a landowner should be mindful of the holding
of this case as a means of facilitating recovery for damages
occasioned by the activities of the mineral lessee.
Landowner and Mineral Servitude Owner
The owner of a mineral servitude5O is generally recognized
in Louisiana as having the right to enter the servient estate,
extract the minerals thereunder and reduce them to possession.
To exercise these rights, the servitude owner must ordinarily
make some use of the surface. Thus, disputes over the manner
of exercising this right will inevitably occur.
Louisiana courts have produced little more than general
propositions concerning the surface use rights of the mineral
servitude owner.r l The Louisiana supreme court has on one
occasion, however, dealt directly with this issue. In Grayson v.
Lyons, Prentiss & McCord,52 plaintiff bought land subject to a
reservation of the mineral rights. Oil was discovered on the
adjoining premises, and plaintiff's tract was subsequently unit-
ized, the defendant being appointed unit operator. The land,
50. In Frost-Johnson Lmbr. Co. v. Ballings Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922), the Louisiana supreme court recognized that a sale or reservation
of mineral rights creates nothing more than a servitude entitling the owner
to go onto the servient estate and take possession of the minerals there-
under. Subsequent decisions have applied other code provisions concerning
servitudes to mineral transactions. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La.
183, 215, 34 So.2d 746, 757 (1947) (concurring opinion of Justice Haniter).
51. It has often been asserted that the mineral servitude owner has the
right to enter and leave the premises for the purpose of extracting minerals
and performing all necessary acts in the exercise of this right: "A sale or
reservation of the mineral oil or gas in a tract of land constitutes a sale
or reservation merely of a real right, or personal servitude, to go upon
the land and explore for oil and gas and to possess and own such oil
or gas as may be produced. ... Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 779,
132 So. 229, 230 (1930). For similar observations, see Hodges v. Long-Bell
Petr. Co., 240 La. 198, 121 So.2d 831 (1959); Perkins v. Long-Bell Petr. Co.,
227 La. 1044, 81 So.2d 389 (1955); Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So.2d
657 (1954); Union Sulphur v. Andrau, 217 La. 662, 47 So.2d 38 (1950); Con-
tinental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So.2d 73 (1949); Standard Oil Co.
v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So.2d 65 (1943); Deas v. Lane, 202 La. 933, 13 So.2d
270 (1943); Patton's Heirs v. Moseley, 186 La. 1088, 173 So. 772 (1937); Gulf
Ref. Co. v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936); State, Sabine River Auth.
v. Salter, 184 So.2d 783 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Smith v. Anisman, 85 So.2d
351 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956). Federal courts have made similar statements,
and have shed no more light upon the problem. See United States v. Nebo
Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951); Frost Lmbr. Indus. v. Republic Prod.,
112 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1940); Crawford v. Texas Co., 99 F. Supp. 766 (W.D.
La. 1951).
52. 226 La. 462, 76 So.2d 531 (1954).
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previously used as farmland, had been abandoned as such. With-
out notifying landowner-plaintiff, defendant constructed a road
to serve the unit well over plaintiff's property. Plaintiff alleged
that defendant, by this act, committed a trespass. The court
ruled that plaintiff bought the land subject to the outstanding
mineral interest, and that the conduct complained of was neces-
sary in the exercise of that interest. Although not specifically
stating a reason, the court found that defendant exercised its
right in an unnecessary manner. In arriving at this conclusion,
no reference was made to the Civil Code. Instead, the court
cited as authority Patout v. Lewis,53 a case involving a conven-
tional servitude unrelated to mineral rights transactions. The
court thus failed to announce a standard under which future
cases may be decided. Nevertheless, in relying upon Lewis, the
court may have indicated its -willingness to consider the ap-
plicability of the Civil Code and related jurisprudence to the
solution of the problem.
Several articles of the Civil Code could be applicable to
the rights and obligations of the landowner and the mineral
servitude owner regarding use of the surface. Article 771 pro-
vides that in establishing a servitude, all that is necessary to
exercise it is also created at the same time; these accessory
rights, however, must be exercised in the manner least incon-
venient to the servient estate.5 4 Article 772 allows the owner
of the dominant estate to make all works needed for the use
and maintenance of the servitude. 55 The owner of the dominant
estate may, under article 774, enter the servient estate in order
to construct or repair the necessary works and may also deposit
materials and rubbish thereon. 5 If the act creating the servitude
53. 51 La. Ann. 210, 25 So. 134 (1899).
54. An accessory of passage, for example, must, according to Civil Code
article 771, be exercised in the manner least inconvenient to the servient
estate. Where a servitude exists entitling the owner of the dominant estate
to a one-half interest in an artesian well, the laying of a pipe to the well
is considered necessary for the use of the servitude, and the owner of the
servient estate may not tamper with it. Givens v. Chandler, 143 So. 79 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1932).
55. If, as part of his right of servitude, the owner of the dominant
estate is allowed to use part of the servient estate as a dumping ground
for sugar cane, he is entitled to construct a fence to keep cattle out.
Patout v. Lewis, 51 La. Ann. 210, 25 So. 134 (1899).
56. In the exercise of a servitude granting a right of way for telephone
lines, the servitude owner may cut trees within six feet of the line without
facing liability. Sticker v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 101 So.2d 476 (La.
App. ist Cir. 1958). Where trees have been cut along a right-of-way, however,
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states otherwise, the agreement must control.5 7 Article 777 pro-
hibits the servient estate owner from diminishing the use of the
servient estate or making it more inconvenient. He may not
change the condition of the premises, nor may he transfer the
place where the servitude is exercised.5s But if the original loca-
tion becomes more burdensome to the servient estate, the owner
may offer the owner of the dominant estate a place equally
convenient for its exercise, and he must accept it.59 Article 778
requires the servitude owner to use it only according to his
title. He must make no alteration in either estate which would
make the condition of the servient estate worse.6
If the manner in which the servitude is to be exercised is
uncertain, the owner of the servient estate must, according to
Article 779, fix the place where he wishes it exercised. In a
servitude of passage, if the place where it is to be exercised
is uncertain, it is the duty of the servient estate owner to fix
the location. If he allows the servitude owner to establish it in a
particular place and voices no protest, he is deemed to have
acquiesced in the selection of the locale.," Also, the owner of
the servient estate who remains silent while his lessee selects
the servitude owner may not simply pile them onto land not subject to the
servitude. Kerr v. Central La. Elec. Co,, 59 So.2d 209 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952).
In constructing works on the servient estate, the servitude owner may tear
down a levee and create other temporary damage, but must restore the
land to its original condition once finished. Duet v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 169 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. La. 1958). It has been held that a servitude owner
need not have the consent of the owner of the servient estate before going
onto the land. Miller v. Prairie Canal Co., 229 So.2d 752 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969). But see Grayson v. Lyons, Prentiss & McCord, 226 La. 462, 76 So.2d
531 (1954).
57. LA. Civ. CoD art. 709: "The use and extent of servitudes thus estab-
lished are regulated by the title by which they are granted .... "
58. The servient estate owner may not construct a fence across an area
set aside for a servitude of passage, Patout v. Lewis, 51 La. Ann. 210, 25
So. 134 (1899), nor may he perform excavation upon such an area, Bruning
v. New Orleans Canal 4 Banking Co., 12 La. Ann. 541 (1857). See also
Schaffer v. State Nat'l Bank, 37 La. Ann. 242 (1855); Waters v. Backus,
8 Mart.(O.S.) 1 (1820); Kaffle v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 184 So.2d 595
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1966); Nelson v. Warren, 157 So.2d 762 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963); Arkansas-La. Gas Co. v. Cutrer, 30 So.2d 864 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
59. If a servitude of passage is being exercised, in the opinion of the
servient estate owner, too close to his residence, he has a right to change
its location, provided the change is to be a place suitably convenient.
Ronaldson v. Vicknair, 185 So. 52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938). Contra, Arkansas-
La. Gas Co. v. Cutrer, 30 So.2d 864 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
60. See, e.g., Shaffer v. State Nat'l Bank, 37 La. Ann. 242 (1855); Dickson
v. Arkansas-La. Gas Co., 193 So. 246 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
61. Patout v. Lewis, 51 La. Ann. 210, 25 So. 134 (1899).
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a location for the exercise of the servitude will be bound
thereby.6
Other provisions of the Civil Code on servitudes may prove
helpful in an analysis of the problem. If the servitude owner is
prevented from using his servitude because of an obstacle which
he can neither prevent nor remove, prescription liberandi causa
does not run so long as the obstacle remains." There may be
a tacit release of the servitude, as where the owner of the
dominant estate allows the owner of servient estate to build
works which would necessarily mean the discontinuance of the
servitude.6 4 But consent for the construction of these works
must be expressly given, verbally or in writing, and the works
constructed must be of solid and permanent nature.6 Although
requisite consent has been given by the participation in the use
of the obstruction, 6 in most instances the courts have required
either verbal or written consent in order to find extinguishment
by tacit release.6 7 As a general matter of contractual interpreta-
tion, article 753 requires that the manner and extent of servitudes
are always to be interpreted in favor of the owner of the
servient estate. The courts have generally exercised adherence
to this provision.
The Louisiana courts have relied heavily upon the above
provisions of the Civil Code in resolving disputes involving the
manner of exercising predial servitudes. The redactors of the
62. Ronaldson v. Vicknair, 185 So. 52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938). The court
based this conclusion on Civil Code article 760, which allows he who assumes
the quality of owner or he who acts in the name of the owner to acquire
servitudes.
63. LA. CIv. CoDS art. 792.
64. Id. art. 819.
65. Id. art. 820.
66. Theriot v. Consolidated Co., 160 La. 459, 107 So. 305 (1926). Richaud,
plaintiff's vendor, had sold land to defendant, reserving a right of passage
along a ten foot strip. Before he sold the dominant estate to plaintiff,
he allowed defendant to construct a garage on the rear part of the strip.
Richaud used the garage, and was thus deemed to have consented to the
obstruction, and the servitude was considered extinguished.
67. Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. Ann. 469 (1883); Delahoussaye v. Judice,
13 La. Ann. 587 (1858); Lavillebeuvre v. Cosgrove, 13 La. Ann. 323 (1858);
James v. Buchert, 144 So.2d 435 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
68. "Contracts whereby servitudes are created, are designed to confer
rights and impose obligations, which, otherwise would have no existence
and should be strictly construed." Dickson v. Arkansas-La. Gas Co., 193 So.
246, 249 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939), quoting from Shaffer v. State Nat'l Bank,
37 La. Ann. 242 (1885). See also Clause v. Broussard, 146 So.2d 828 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962), writs refused, 243 La. 1004, 149 So.2d 763 (1963).
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Civil Code could not, however, have envisioned the existence
of the mineral servitude in the form it has assumed today.
It is for this reason that a new standard has been suggested,
a subjective one which would emphasize the compatability of
surface use rights and the need to conduct surface activities in
a reasonable and proper manner. It has been suggested that
"[tlhe owner of land burdened by a mineral right and the
owner of a mineral right . . . have correlative rights and duties
regarding the exercise of their respective rights. Thus, each
must exercise his rights with reasonable regard for the rights
of the other."'0 9 This standard makes no suggestion that liability
must always be based on a finding of negligence. It is conceiv-
able that some activities, however carefully performed, could
be actionable under this standard, such as the conduct of hazard-
ous activity unduly threatening the other party's concurrent
use right.70 The primary emphasis, however, is on compelling
the mineral servitude owner and the landowner to conduct their
activities in a compatible manner.
This standard, if properly utilized, could prove to be of
great value. As the amount of available land progressively
diminishes, it should become a matter of public policy to em-
phasize the need for multiple uses of available land. No tract of
land should be destined for the performance of only one func-
tion solely because of the inconvenience of multiple use when
the land is properly suited for such use. Until such a standard
is adopted, however, the Civil Code remains the most likely
basis of authority for resolution of disputes of this nature. These
articles provide considerable latitude for courts to reach equit-
able results in each fact situation. When read together, the
articles can fairly be said to envision a relationship between
dominant and servient estate owner wherein the owner of the
servient estate is obligated to surrender that portion of surface
area reasonably necessary for performance. At the same time,
the dominant estate owner must conduct his activities mindful
of his duty to minimize inconvenience to the servient estate.
It must be said, however, that these articles, if applied strictly,
69. LA. STATE LAW INST., SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW-




could lead to some undesirable results71 Therefore, the special
character of the industry should be considered before resorting
to any unduly strict interpretation of them.
Robert J. Prejeant
THE "$30 OR 30 DAYS" FINE AS APPLIED TO INDIGENTS
The practice of imprisoning convicted defendants for failure
to pay fines was firmly imbedded in the common law1 and is
established by statute in most states.2 Imprisonment for non-
payment of a fine was seldom questioned in federal courts, and,
until the 1960's, none of the challenges to this procedure appears
to have been founded upon a defendant's indigency.3 Even as
late as 1968, a federal district court upheld on constitutional
grounds the practice of imprisonment of indigents under the
alternative sentence of fine or imprisonment.4 Consequently, the
Fifth Circuit's recent pronouncement that the alternative sen-
71. For example, if article 779 were strictly applied, it would mean the
landowner could select the location upon which the mineral servitude should
be exercised, because the manner of exercising the servitude would be
uncertain. The mineral servitude owner or those who derive their rights
therefrom will always be in a better position to know the best place to
locate a well, not the landowner.
1. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 311 (8th ed. 1970): "But it
was in the reign of Edward I in the latter half of the thirteenth century
that incarceration came into extensive use In England, though even in this
period it was used primarily as a 'squeezer,' or means of securing fines."
See also 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGIUSH LAW 43-50 (3d ed. 1927);
1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 57 (1883); STURGE,
STEPHEN'S DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 32-33 (9th ed. 1950).
2. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.010, .030 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-10-10 (1963); HAWAI REv. STAT. §§ 712-14 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. §
9-2227a (Supp. 1972); NEv. Rzv. STAT. § 176.065 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 7221-23 (Supp. 1972).
3. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 113 n.10, 473 P.2d 999, 1007 n.10, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 255, 263 n.10 (1970): "Prior to 1960 none of the cases appear to have
involved challenges based upon a defendant's indigency. [Citations omitted.]
The question whether the imprisonment of indigent convicted defendants
for non-payment of fines offended the equal protection clause under the
principle declared in Griffin was raised in Wildeblood v. United States,
supra, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 163, 284 F.2d 592 (dissent by Edgerton, J.). During
the last ten years numerous cases dealt with the question." [Citations
omitted.]
See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 926 (1970), and 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitu-
tional Law § 388 at 727-28 (1964).
4. Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732, 736 (D. Mich. 1968): "It has
been generally held that commitment under such circumstances is not an
unconstitutional imprisonment for debt, and that it does not violate any
other constitutional provision, although doubt has been expressed where it
results in a total imprisonment longer than the maximum imprisonment
which could have been imposed for the offense." (Emphasis added.)
